Via leasing spectrum and equipments from telecommunication operators, industry could realize 5G non-public network to enable killer applications such as as intelligent factory. However, the popularity of 5G opensource and cheap software define radio (SDR) platform makes implementation threshold of experimental 5G base stations (BSs) much lower. Adversary could easily adopt such BSs to launch malicious attacks against availability, integrity, and privacy of industrial 5G endpoint devices. For example, the industry competitor can carry the portable rogue BSs to launch DoS attacks to nearby industrial IoT devices. In this case, the 5G module on the device is disable and cannot receive commands to operate, whereby causing significantly damage. In this speech, we demonstrate the the mentioned rogue BS attacks. Moreover, we try to deploy sensors in 5G non-public networks and cooperate with mobile edge computing (MEC) to detect the rogue BS attack and mitigate its negative effects.
Shin-Ming Cheng received his B.S. and Ph.D. degrees in computer science and information engineering from National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan, in 2000 and 2007, respectively. Since 2012, he has been on the faculty of the Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology, Taipei, where he is currently an associate professor. Since 2017, he has been with the Research Center for Information Technology Innovation, Academia Sinica, Taipei, as a joint assistant research fellow. Since 2014, he incubates cybersecurity talent with the support from Ministry of Education and holds advanced information security summer schools (AIS) each year. His current interests are telecommunications and mobile network security. Moreover, he investigates on IoT system security and development of cybersecurity platform.