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May 4-6 at Taipei Nangang Exhibition Center, Hall 2

Taiwan's Cybersecurity Researchers
OT Security Forum
  • May 4th (Tue)
  • 14:45 - 15:15
  • 7F 701G

Common Flaws in Public and Private ICS Network Protocols

Industrial Control Systems / Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (ICS/SCADA) are both the lifeblood of any critical infrastructure, and play an important role in any operation’s ability to communicate between various ICS components, relay sensitive data, or manage critical sensors and equipment. Due to the specific and unique needs of the industrial control industry, ICS vendors are forced to choose between using public network protocols or creating private proprietary protocols based on the different needs of programmable logic controller (PLC) vendors. Each protocol has their own potential risk profile that must be considered in relation to security concerns and operational requirements.

In our research, we analyze 9 ICS protocols (5 public and 4 private) which are widely used in the critical infrastructure sectors of power, water, transportation, petroleum, and manufacturing. In each of these public and private ICS protocols, we found some common flaws which allow attackers to easily sniff unencrypted traffic and perform ICS protocol-centered attacks. These attacks include T833 - Modify Control Logic, T836 - Modify Parameter, T843 - Program Download, T856 - Spoof Reporting Message - Modbus/TCP and T855 - Unauthorized Command Message which map to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS. Attacker can be accomplished without the intruder needing to acquire authentication or authorization. Also, we provide 5 attack demos which across 1 public and 3 private protocols, to show how these common flaws will cause huge impacts such as T832 - Manipulation of View and T831 - Manipulation of Control to ICS. Finally, we demonstrate how to againist ICS network protocols attack.

ICS/SCADA Security Network SecurityCritical Infrastructure Protection
Mars Cheng

Mars Cheng

Threat Researcher, TXOne Networks

Mars Cheng is a threat researcher for TXOne Networks, blending a background and experience in both ICS/SCADA and Enterprise cybersecurity systems. Mars has directly contributed to more than 10 CVE-IDs, and has had work published in three Science Citation Index (SCI) applied cryptography journals. Before joining TXOne, Mars was a security engineer at the Taiwan National Center for Cyber Security Technology (NCCST). Mars is a frequent speaker and trainer at several international cyber security conferences such as Black Hat, HITB, HITCON, SecTor, ICS Cyber Security Conference USA and Asia, CLOUDSEC, and InfoSec Taiwan as well as other conferences and seminars related to the topics of ICS and IoT security. Mars is general coordinator of HITCON 2021 and was vice general coordinator of HITCON 2020.

Selmon Yang

Selmon Yang

Senior DPI Engineer, TXOne Networks

Selmon Yang is a senior DPI engineer at TXOne Networks. He is responsible for parsing IT/OT Protocol, Linux kernel programming and honeypot development and adjustment. Selmon also spoke at HITCON CMT and HITB.